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ATTACKS ON THE CARTESIAN COGiro 
INTRQDlJG:flOli 
1. Purpose of the Dissertation 
The pur-pose of this dissertation is to exam1ne the 
attacks which have been made on the Cartesian cogito. '!'he 
attempt is made to determine the validit'Y both err the car, 
tesian pr1nci.ples and or the various c;r1ticisms made of 
them. 
2. Method of the Dissel'tation 
The procedure followed in this dissertation may be 
·divided :into three aspects: 1) a ~areful -su~ve-y of: Des-: 
cartes 1 s writings which bear on the problem of the c-ogi to;_ 
2) an examination of the criticis~s which Descartes's con-
temporaries mde o:f his views, and of his :replies to these 
criticisms; and 3) a atrvey of the tmportant crl tioisms or 
the Cartesian philosophy made from Pescartest s time to the 
present .. 
Renee the method of the d1 ssertation is both dese.rip-
t1 ve and normat iva. On the one hruid, it attempts to. collect 
these criticisms and to present thel!l. systematic ally._ On 
!ttt~oduction 2 
the., othel", a eons.tant effort is made to evaluate the at-
tacks. 
;. · Previous Work in the Field 
A great body of' l'it&:Pat\'lr'e ha~ a!'iSen on the problems 
raised by Descartes t s 1 philo~ophy. Such works of this 
literature which bear on the Oartesitin cogito and its in-
terpretation are used throughout the .dissertation. 2 Sev-
eral of these expository studies are very important-. 
GUson1 s oom.xtentary on the Discouzos de la MSthode is .in-
valuable for 1ts oroas-reterenees and insights; and G:U-
so.n.'s other works, espeeislly- ERPK, are valuable in deter--
mining the sebolastie intl\lt':Ulce.s on Cartesian tho llght. 
Bla.nehet, AH, also ind.ieatas many of the l:l1stor1ea.l aourees 
of Descartes t s philosophy,''. Gibson, POD, is an il'lil'portant 
sttady whieh, at the time 0f its~,.prmtiUg, 3 was $e :tixost 
aeeo,unt in English of the philo:sophy of DeseB.Ptes "in j_t-
self and for: itselfoff4 Fisehe:r-'s aecount ~f Deseart&s 1n: 
Geschichte der neueran Phflosoph:ie5 is a tnorough .and 1mpo.r-
tan.t .exposition of Deseartes' ~ phUos.ophy~ as. is al$0 the 
introduction by Veitch to his translation of Deses.l"tes .• 
_.._. __ ,,_ .... _;... ...... __ ,_ ___ _ 
1. Descartes's. name, as Ada~ points out, was al.ways lfl"1 t-
ten by the philosopher aa. one erd.. On several. off1cia1 
documents,. however, there 1$ an interval between Des ·and 
08.l"tes. Use of the single wo:rd has become standard. See 
Adam, VD,. 7, n. 1:),. . 
2.. See. below, 4, :f'or a bibliogPaphieal nc>te, and also 
Bibliography I fGr .au explanation of the doeumen:ta:t10~ }• 1932· . 
4.. Gibson,. POD,. v11. 
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CHAPTER I 
DESCARTES 1 S DTHOD 
1. Motivation and Backpound 
That Descartes oo:nstdere d hia life as e-on~era.ted fol'c a 
special and al.most divine mission is very ev1cl&nt to the 
reader of the Diseours de la Methode; and indeed his entU>e 
biog:ttaphy testifies to this faet. 
1. Biog:r,apb:y. :Dfiseart&s was born on the last day of 
Jlareh, 1596, at La. R•ye, in. !oura.1ne .. 1 He was the son of 
Joaehim Descartes, who had entered the Parliament of Brit-
tany on December 6, 1585_. as a eounellor; and who remained 
in public s.ervi·ee most of his life. 2: As an infant, Des-
cartes was very sickly, and for a time there was serious 
doubt if he would survive. His disposi tiona! weakness 
was undoubteQly in'herited from his mother, who died short-
1y atter his birth.. 3 From the age of eight to sixteen,. 
--- ..,... ______ , ...... ~---
1. 1fhe first. bio~aphy or Deseartes was tha.:t; ot Baillet; 
the DIQSt eompl.ete is Adam.~ VD, which is Vol. XI! of Adam 
and Tannery{ ed. )., OD. See also Fischer, GIP, I, and Sirven~ 
AAD. 
2.. On the life of' Joaeh1m Dese8.l"teS, see Adam, VD, 9-18. 
3• Of. TG Elizabeth (lfay Or Jun&, 1&45): near, estant 
M d'f une :me:Pe qui li10'Ql"'Ut, l'i\)9U de jours &pres ma m.aiasanc.e_ 









I.. Descartes t s .Method 15 
divine entih:ms iasm. and vivid 1mag1nat!on.1 Foucher de 
Cat-iel was also able to speak of the poet!7 in De$eartest s 
. 2. 
nat1..1re. 'l'be philosopher-'s de.sc:Piptions of the human soul 
and of God are 'indeed very beautiful; and one senses a 
type of spirituality running through _the whole of suoh a 
work as the ll&ditations. negardless of' one t s judgment on 
the Cartesian 'P:hilosonhy" he will agree3 with Se:rrus that 
the God of Desc:artes has t~uly been attained by a medita-
tion, and not stm~ly thought as an abstract idea or intro-
duced as a dogma. 0 0ette oeuvre realis-e le para.<hxe de 
presenter 1 1onto1·6gie ~mme un peeme. "4 
3· Des<Jat>test:s sineerit;y. · '!'he queS:t1on ·of Des.eartes• s 
s.incerit'_1;, especis.ll7 his religio-us sineerity, has vexed 
many eomment~toi"s of bi s works. And there are sever-al 1n-
dica tiona which migh-t wggest this.. He delayed tl:le · publ iea-
tion of Le Monde after bearing ot Gal ileo t .s condemnation 
by the Church tor his teaching that the world :revolved 
abont the $Un; and when Desaartests oosmology did finally 
---~----- ..... ----~ 
1. Of. Baillet: "Car' 11 :ne. e:roio:tt pas quton dot ~t' 
etonner s1 fort de voir que les Poetes,_ meme C$UX qui ne: . 
font q'~• z::ta1ser, fussent ple~ns de senteno.es plus graves, 
plus sens~es,. et mieux ex~imees que eellea qui se t:r>ou~-ent 
dans J.es eer1 ts des Philosophes.. !1 attri.b1101t eette Inel"-
veille a la. divinite de ]. 'Elitbous1asme t et. a J.a tore& de 1 1 
lJnaJ;in&.tion, qui fait sortir les semenoes de la sagesse 
(qui se t:t"Oltvant dans ltesprit des tousles b.ol!!':lBles, oomme 
les etineelles de :feu dans las eailloux) avee beaucoup plus 
de !"aailite ~,t beauooup plus de brillant meme, que na pe.ut 
faire la Raison dans lea Pbilo$onhes.ft VMD,. X, 184~ 
2 • . cr. Vl!, 34· 
3· Hel:".e again Lero:r is an ex-caption. IUs views are ex-




:istie one Gf Kahn. •. ·Kahn"believes that Deseartes 1 s ap-
proach .fs the naturalistie one of ttltee:ping strictly away 
.!"rom whatever :t;ua.d a ·s.upernat~al. tinge; nl and holds that 
the problems of Go·d and ttl..$ !iOU:l, ·usually taken as· central 
fOP ·Dese:artes • s thought,· are not really centx>a.l at all. 
A elose s-tudy of his sys.tem makes tt ·obviou"s 
that hi.s whole philo&~.ophie scheme does not 
justii"y the signi:ficanee. ascribed to_tb.ese 
problems.. The e:xistenoe of' God and the soul 
aPe :made use~ from the point of view of 
his sc:ience • .lf: -
F1na.l.1y, l:ahn :argues that Des-oartes'fs refusal to deal. 
. . . . 
with difficn:llt questi'ons o:f faith ~dieates "that whUe 
. ' ~ .. • 
his love for truth was strong, his lover:£ sel.f was 
. . n.3 . 
stronger. · 
Descartes himself w:t't6te:• that God and the human soul 
are the .foundations of h1.s system;4 and that nsemper 
exist1mav1 duas quaestiones, de Deo ·et de Anima, praeci-
pnas esse ex 11s q-uae Philosophiae po tui:s quam The,ologia.e 
ope .sunt demon.strandae."5 And also in the expos 1tion' of 
his system,· the probl.em:s ot God and the soul are px-ere-. 
'll:liSi te to est-ablishing any :Scientif'ie. knowledge. TCJ ar-
,gu&, therefo:re, that ·Deseartest s God is. not log:teall"J nee-
essRPy to his sys.tem is grossly :m erZJOr .. 6 
1.. Kahn, MSID1 19·· 
2• Ibid.' .Z?. 
,. Ibid .. , 53· . . , 
· 4- ~·, Pre.f:. 11 En la 4, les .raisQ.Il.8 pU" lesq":el.les 
U prouve. l•ei!stenc:e d~ DiEHl et de 1' ame humaine, qui 
sout des fendemens de sa lteta:physique. n- · VI, 1 ... 
5· Ked. 1 VII, 1. , ~.. 1b!a statem.nt is supported in the examination of 






















Ia Desearte.s's Method 39 
that he indieated that he had done ao. 1 :lor is' ther& any-
thing in the Respc>ns.es whieb. permits one to infer whether 
or not Desear-tes had read Augustin&. ; Gilson concludes that 
sans d.oute, les -probabilites qu' 11 a.it lu 
solll,t pa.ndes, ma.is on n.•en )leut faire une 
oe~titude et · tottte~ le:s speeulations sur ce 
SUj$t. sont aondamnees a rester pureme.nt hypo-
th&tiques. 2: · 
Bllt though this possibility of' historical innuence remains 
oni:r a possibility, moat auihorities agree that Desoartea•a 
use o.r the eogito ~gument is Gl'"iginal.· Blanchet writes 
that this argument, obsetll'"ely reeognized in lfeo-Platonism, 
eleuer ·in Augustine and the Renaissance philosophers, is 
1n .Dese~tes "l'expression achevee~ eette fois pleinement 
claiPe et diati:aete • .,3 Ha.1BGlin believes that Desca.rtes J s 
argument, in holding that God is ktiown bef"ore, and wi tbout 
knO'flledge of, the bodyt is original, al.though its uae to 
distinguish the· two substanees is eloae to Augustine. 4 GU-
Scott a.dde that "de son point de vue, son propre argtn11ent se 
suff1t ·sa.n.. lfautborite dtA:agust.!n.e et, en outre, les deux 
arguments reatent es.se:ntielle.:m:ent d1.t'fex-enta .. w5 
A second arg"'lllent ver-,. elose to Des car tea' s o.og1 to 1s 
th-e •cognt>see.re est essett of the pan:p·sychist Campanella. 6 
_..,... ______ ....... ~ __ ..,..._._.. 
lee \b :ax (lfov., 1640), Iii, 247• 
2.. OUson, EBPtl, 192. 
3· Blanehet, AH, 1o7. 
4• llsmelin, SD, 122-123· 
,5• G'ft.son, EB:PK, 192· "'II~ is ll l'es~. vra1. de d:U-e que, 
:methode a part, Deseartes s' etait engage par la :to:Pee des 
1d:9es dans une voie qui le ramenait a eelle de saint Augus-
tin.. " Ibid .. ., 200. ' . 
6. Campanella's arguments may be found in Universal.is 
P.b.iloso~hia, Prodromus De sensu rerum et mag!€t, and the 
Rei11s Miilos,:>pb!a en!iogisticao This entiFe problem is 















les lllains, e t au t:r:-es cho·ses de eette natlll'e .. "1 Yet it is 
necessary. to l"'eeall tb.atit as a. ran, one 1s a.ceuatoDBd to 
dream,. and to repr~us en.t · sueh th1ngs as these. in his dreams .. 
In d:retu'.ls one bas at times Up$r1ences which aeem just as 
re~l as those of the waking state;: 1nde:ed,. as o»e l"&fi&ets 
upon the d1£ferenee between the sleeping and walt1JJB state, 
he sees tts1 manif'estement qu 1 11 n'y a point d• i:ndiees eoa-
el.nans, ni de ma:rques assez certaines Pal' ou l 'on puisse 
d1st1nguer ne,ttelll&nt .la v•ille d 1:a1ree le soDJmeil .. " 2 
'!'bus it is possibl$ that the particular tbings or lbioh 
one .is awa.Pe through h1s senses eould be only illusions, and 
that On$ 's body and all sueb aensible objeats do mt in f'a.ct 
exist .. 3 At tl:l$ ,e(l1lle t in;te1, howvel*, it is neces.s_.y to ·not& 
tha;.t there aJ:"e soal objects Jlllre Sitr.Jple md uuive~aal whieh 
•1' seem to ~e real Slld. ex1ating. Among St<tab things &M 
0019'-poreal, l;Url.t"~re and it• extension" together with the figure, 
s1$e 1 ntJllib'el", plae• and timec ot · e:i teded things .. 4 Also· 
matbellaties, beeause it. d~aJ.s ·With thf) more simple and uni-
VePSal, ·seems: to O<>ntain something that 1• certain and ··1n-
4ubitable .. 5 ·FoP 5J.talflPle, it aeea mo.st imp.,o.ba:ble that when 
one !lilds two and tlu?ee or numbers the s,idetf. of' a aquaze ~ he 
lilj . lied., ·IX, A, 14· ·. 
2· !i!d:~, IX,. Ali 15·· ·Wahl o.all.s attention to the :fact 
tbat •un des 'fl~in~iJ!an motif's du douta c~t$s1.n_. e'sat · 
l *&JXistenae de la Dtet«)'.;rie .. "· RI!, 2· 
3~ :Rato:i,"p- abt:>ws tb4 t Dea4'artea. r ,., argnDn t again.st tbe 
ll.erl$&8 redn~e tQ. twot 1} f'Z'Om ar-.ms; aDd 2) f'rom illusions:. 
DE. 45-52.. . .. · 
4,.. Ked., IX. A, 1~. Bote that thia stateant ,includes· 
an objei:it'e •prima.r7 . qualities, whileo the tramediately · 
~eedmg ~isons~ion 1& (~On'Cern&d. ns:u.•e e~c1ally with 
secondary qualiti~s. 
5· Ibid.,. , DC, A, 1,,. 

ll· The Ce~tainty of the Cogito 55 
On$' fUPthe:r .Qoub'b remains to be tested; ":qe me au1s-je 
done pas ausai perS\1ade que je n.•atais point?"l· 
Descartes's use or this &lt$ptiea.l pmcedure :needs 
caaref'ul. attention. It is 11l!.pl"'bable that Descartes was 
not influenced by the skeptical tendencies of Renaissance 
2 thinkers.~· lie was very carefu 1 to state._. howeve~, the pre-
oise diff&rence between his use of the skeptical procedure 
and that or the skeptiest 
Bon que j 'blitasae pom- e-&la les Sceptiqu&s;~~ 
qui ne do utent _. pour dOtrt&r ;~~ et affeetent 
d' estre tou.sjours ~esolus: . e&l", an eon-
traire, m ut JIIOn ·nesaain. ll.e tendo it qu• a m' 
assurer, et a reje·tter la. terre mouven.te et 
la sable, pol.fr ~ .. :vel;- le roo: on, 1* argile. 3 
It is necessary, at least once in one r s lifetime, to set 
his beliefs .in doubt, said Deseartes;.4 but he neither 
reeonmended this procedure for all persons, 5 nor believed 
that auch skepticism shoul.d be an end in itself .. 6 "Le 
d.oote universal de Descartes, • as Brunschvieg says, "ne 
s•exe:rne done pas, oomme ehe.z les Seeptiqms oo comme chez 
Monta.!sne, a:c pro:f'it du ooute lui-m~; • 7 and Gibson adds,. 
8What ·reoally was remark able was the use o:f seeptieism to 
,__ ___ .,... ____ -:---- .,..., .. 
];.• Med~ , IX; A, 19. 2.. See supra, J.+o-41. 
3·. Dise,., VI, 21·. 
4 cr:-Prine. I, l" IX, B., 25. 
;. Dis e. , VI~· 4· 
b. cr.-Raehe:rehe., X, 51>3• l:tt'b.its, Art. (1939), att$mpts 
to show a possjj/).le .infl.aenee of the Stoic ertteriau of truth 
on this en. tiPe &kel't1:cal. pra~4u.re• _(See ll.!t~genea Laertius, 
Lives, VII, 45-4.-6.) JCu&iu alS> eomm.ent& that uthe ae~-ot1oa.l 
4lift ieulty arising t~ pl:l.j's1olog1aal eonditio:ns is avoided 
by aeee}'tillg .illt-111 tive km wleHige~ of t·he eoatent or the· ima-
sination but Ce~~~ing B1l8pt!nsion o! Judgment as to its 
:Pept"ttse-ata. t iv-e- vfU,. ue. " Ibid~ , 485.. . 







desire ror ve:rb9l tr-iek6ry and of seeking e.vasions.1 
ll'Qbb,es and· :Bourdin. al.so did not und$crstan4 Descartes: 'a 
62 
p;J.'O eedure. 2 Hobbes believed tbat the FiPst lteditation 
indicated merely- that •.s1, 1ua.ns nous aidel' dLaucun autre 
z,"&!lison, nou.s suivons .setueBlent nos sens, nous avons jnste 
suj&t de do'Uter ai QlJ&lque ehcise existe on mn. •3 Finally, 
Botirdin apent a good deal &t tim.e d1senss1ng methodolog1-
eal doubt, asking s11eh que.atd.:ons as •quid minimum dubita-
t1o.nia?• 8 qn1d, pro t'tilso b.abendumt• and "quaten,,s haben-
dum pPO,talso?•4 
Eaeh or these erit1c1sms, howeve:r,. 1s based on a 
serioua misunderstanding of Descartes's intention in using 
$k~-pticiftl: as a IUethoa. Deseartes 's raply to Oasaend1 was· 
tbat his pro.eedtil"e was not an artifice, but a neoesaary 
dev1e• ·.for ·the. el'tm!M'tion of error. 5 1b Hobbes Descartes 
replied that his p~ocadul:"e is net: ~o show that a~nne .sen-
sible thmga may be & ubted, but rather to prep&J:>e the 
. . . . . 
reader ~or the exposition of earta.in t:r-uths to f()llo:w. b 
~ r1!JtJ.p.0nse to Botll'din,. however, . indicated by a rathe_r 
homely coli1Par1son the nature of his skeptical procednre: 


II. !he ~tainty: af the Ooglto 
An Arehimedean certainty, then, is found in the exist-
ence of the doubter;· the one who doubts must certa1nl.,- ex-
ist. But what type ot thing ia this doubter? Descartes 
answered, •une ob.ose qui pense. 1tl Is this doubter more 
than thought? Descartes excited his ima.ination, but he 
understood "manifestement que r:!en de ~out ce q oe j e puis 
'- .... 
comprendre pal" le moyen de 1 1 imagination n' appartient a 
cette eomutissance que j t ai de moi-mesme. tt2 Hencejt Des-
eartes wr@te:_.: 
his qut est-ce done je auis? tJne chose qui 
pense., Qu'est-ce qu'une chose qui pense? 
c•est: a dire une eh.ose qui doute, qui cen.-
~oit, qui affirme, qui nie,. qui veut" qui 3' 
ne veut pa. s, qui imagine auss 1, et qui eent. 
·The-se attributes 'belong to the mind, Descartes argued, be-
eause none ot them can be distinguisb.eci from •ma. pensee • .,4 
Descartes 1 s srgum.ent thus .taro :invt>l ves two assertions. 
First, he is holding that th& eontents of eonac:lousness a.~e 
indubitable, and heme that th•y are the only valid starting 
point in knowied.ge;. 5 and secondly., he is aro guing that per-
sonality or .sel.fhood is the whole o:t pre sent eonseiousness. 6 
The meaning and impliea.tion or these assertions is that the 
"given• for knowledge is immediate conscious experience, and 





Med.J IX, A, 21. 
niT'd., IX, A, 22. 
Ibid .. , IX, A, 22. Sae also ibld. , IX, A, 27. 
Descartes' a definition of' pensee is given below,. 78. 
5· Of • Ked. , VII, 29 .. 
. ~e cr. rasp. I: • je con,o1 auss1 que ltesprit est une 
ehose oomp ete, qui d.oute, qui veut ete." IX, A, 95· 'this 







point must be viewed in the light af· llis general. estimate 
ot tbe sys.te:m as a "p-robl.etuatie :idealis• ttl · Ide& ism Kant 
takes to be the view that d.•elare.s that the ex.iatenee- iD. 
.space ot objeets outs. .ids the· ltnowe~ :is. doubtful or inldelJ:Dn• 
strable... Des<:Jartes t: s view is problema tie id-.li.sm because 
·the sum is tb.• :')J.'lly indubitable assex-t1on. At ih is point, 
-
bJ11:10nd this aaeart1Qn:t 
The r~uired pr-Qof' lltlst, tl:ter-etor$, show tb.a.t 
we have e§?ar:ierm·e., and :not merely l-.gina.tiou 
of o.utel' th1JlSS: a.n.d this~ it would seem, oan4 
not be •=.ieved save. b7 ppaof' that e•en Ul.nerc 
•xperienea, -.h1.eh f'or :Deso'artes 1• indubitable., 
is_· T!O_ssi_.ble.2 .. QlU}'_ on the assumption of outer-
. experienee:.- ·· · · · . 
!:ant holds that there iw an •I think•. 1lh 1eh ean aeoompat17 
all Q:ne.·t s rep~se.nt&.tions; 3 'Put, .jus-t as the proposition 
"I am simp1e" m.u.st be Pegardea as an iJ.rmlecU.ate expt"'ea.ston 
O·f appereeption,. so to·o "what is ra.fe~ed to. as tbtt CartQ-
sian inference, is really '" tautol.crgy7 sin~e- the eosito 
1.. ltant, OPI, 8274-2:75.. lt•mp Smith t s. tz.anslation is 
u-sed h&r$ 1 as well a.a. h1s ccumn.enta.:t"y,. wh:toh eo nta.ina a 
great deal or lUate~.1.s.l Q)1 Kant's relations to his 'Pr&deoes"" 
SO'l"S:~ . 
. :2. lbid·, B215·· ltamelin det'ends De;aGarte~ against Xantt a 
,c~ge he".. "Jiats 4 1 abo:r.d e& probl.eme s.e prasen.te des ma.in-
ten:.ant comma a.~o.e$s:O,ire ches Dsa~tes, e t; en outr$, qt10i. 
qu1 en pause: Kant, h•~tes a r6soln 1& -pr.obl.eme d.ans le .. 
•eme Jans que .:teant, ,a ins~ que ,nouB ·V&:JlOns de le. voir,., et, . · 
sliL s te:st mtel"zooge aulf la real it& e~~~p1r1Q.ui9 des phe.nomen.ea 
e:tendua,. 8 ta. ete }}OU:t"' repo;ndzt·& par l.e :t-eal.:fsme et :DOn pal"'· 1 t 
id8al1Stae ft'JpiPique .. , I.l s.-bl• d~;>ne que J:ant a et$ ®1lble-
:ment mal.hetll"'e'l.lX en definiasan't la. doetr1n& de Descartes u:a 
idealisms •p1riq 11e. 11 SD~ ,24J_o · · . 
... ;1!1. . . 1f . , " 
· 3· .. ant., 'CPn.; B-131· Seaond '1r.Pites-t Et ••est: pl.'-ee1•e-
aent ee mo.1 m$tapbys.iqoe,. 1& t sujet de: la. ·pensee. en general.,' 
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. . 
\fhol$ of :1l'llttediate eons(!;i::>usness; 3) the self' is ot a 
nat,Jre &nth'-ely distine:t from tl:& body or fm.Y corporeal ob- · 
jset. !t is neeessu:y to examine l2110l"e elosely Dssea.rt&s:' s 
$llb$ tanee vie-w of the m.-tnd"' 
a~ CPitieisms. of tb.e substa..rme view..- Desearte:k entin 
argument up to this po:i.nt: leads to the .eoncl. us ion, as Veitch 
puts it, that :n·I think, therfJ-fOP.e I am m1nd~'--I am not the 
opposite o:t mind, I am a defin:t.te or pl"e;eis& s.:msthiDg .. ltlo 
This something, Des~artes has argued., 1s.. 5\ thinking sub-
stance •.. 1Tn:fortun$.tely, howev.- ~ he :Is ne1thel'" eons.iste.n t 
nor adequate in this coneept.ion; and he see.1r1s con.stan.tl:y 
to waver between the substance end the 1t$el fhoodtt vie.w of 
the soul,. 
The c].ear and dist1net ldea of the .selt whieh Deseart_e.:; 
had,. and tlpon whim he. :formul~te.d. ~is mole case, is of im-
m$diate eon$e1o.us expe:vienca~ It 1a this which is ·found by 
. . 
the method of doubt; and it is. tbia which provides him W1 th 
his Arehime~ean oertainty.- And turthe-r-1 he held that the 
whole soul is mindJ tl:s re ia nothing 1n ihe soul whic:h is 
not m1nd1' ·the infe:r·enae: would be, th&l:'e is no.thing in the 
soul :\\b. :W h !s not e.rpe :rienee. Thus far., D&s oa:rtes t s pPO-· 
-
e:ed'llre ~s })oth eonsistent and t:.Jf\11!• B"'t, to establiah and 
main:tatn th.~ view tllat this se-lf :t~ a substanee, h.$ was 
f'orc¢t.d. to the conelt.ls1on that "the ltdnd always. f;hink:s, even 
when one :is not U.at>e of it.2 "'i'o rephrase thi,a somewhat, it 
-.;-a!! ... - fa .. -.---.-·---
1 .. · ··Veitch. ("tr'", ed.), WPD, 22. 
2... Sup~a, 23-. Sae &Uso B01dll isr, HPe.. l, 78-79· · Looke 
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means that the mind has immediate a.xp&rienoe wh1eh is not 
known, 1. e., whieh is not iml!lediate. 
'hese inadequaaie:~ were noted fi:ret by Descartes• s 
correspondents.. Eobbes wrote that theM is no idea of sub-
stanee;1 to whiah Desa:al:'-tes replied that ttu est eerta1n 
qne la pensee ne pent 1;1as esttoa sans nne ehose qui pense~ •2 
which was real.ly avoiding the issr}e. Arnauld also questioned 
Desoartea on this pcd:nt:c one does not understand substances 
immediately and in themselves; btlt rathet:' aaeiden.ts or q-ual-
ities are observed • .aaad the thing in wh1.ob they inhere is 
given· the ·nue substance .. ; lt was Ga.ssendi" however, whose 
Gr-itiei.sms are 'lOst destli"uctive-. Gassendi wrote that it is 
tl"tte that the !Jrlnd ·is a thing whlilh th1n1ts; 7et the nature 
of this operative snbstanee:, togeth~ wi. th how 1 t cohePes 
and, ada:cts it$$lf for diseh.s.Pging its var1o~nJ. :ru:nations,. 
these and other questions are unsolved by the Sl.lbstame the-
OP'J.-4 Purther, this s:obstsnee alw-ays elud$s a.p-p:r>eb.ension,. 
and it is only by eonjeetu:re tb:a.t such a su'b.stl"atmu is 
--~ --,.-.- ....... ---~ ...... -1/lfi*.J 
H·leeted· .Descartests :view at this po1.nt beca~se "this wants 
p-roof. n Barr, Bkc. II,.· ~P· I, See. 10 (I, 128-12.9) ... 
1. i:.!• lii~ .lX, A, 144· . . 
2· an.· III,. IX, A~ 1_;6. 
' 3· ~j· IV, U:, A, 172-173• 4• · - .. _ V: .'*Jram d:te&re sol Um te esse Rem eogi ts.nde~, 
ot>er-at one~ memoras, q,,a,m onmes prius tenebamus; .sad operan-
tem B\tbstant1am, !p:lalis nemp.e sit, quomodo eob.aeraat, quo-
modo ad·. agi~Jndum tam veria. t.a.m varia sese eom:panet, a.c 
htiusm:Jd1_ ca.lilters. Pl."ius fgnorata nobis· non deeJ.aras. tt VII, 
266.. Wood wr-ites. on this point that •th• .self as conceived. 
· in thts way :l$ a. philosonhioal e'1oerfl.u:tty;: 1.t fails to ae-
uOXiip.lish what 1t s.et.oot to do_, nameJ.y, to e~lain the nnity 
and aelf'"""identi ty of the mind in its variOllS t""a.eul ties .and 
aeti.vities. n AJJt .. (19;2), 473· See pas.sim toP an ezoallent 
trs-atm&nt of' Des~~tee 1 s "philosonhy of" mind. 11 ·. 
n:. the O'ertaitt ty 0 r the Cog 1 to 
thought to exist. 1 •Quod nos latet~" continued Gassend1, 
"quod quaeri tur, intima tua substantia est,. euius propri~ 
est cog1tare. tt2 . ibe idea of a substratum, far from being 
a elear and d 1st1n-at idea_, is truly on1y confused and 
f'ietitious; 3 and Gassend1 asked how Descartes eould say 
he bas an idea: of himself, when in fact he either does not 
have one, or he has only avery 1~erfect idea or hiinself'.4 
~is critique ot the notion of substance given by Gas-
send! has been repeated by many thinkers: by Berkeley, 
especially against extended substame,5 by Hegel, whose 
whole philosophy is.~~ in a s-ense, a reaetion against the 
traditional notion of substance.~~ 6 and, coming into the 
modern era, by Per"!!"y7 and Whitehead. 8 Yet in many res:pect.s 
-Gas.sendi most .foreshadowed Hnme. 
Hnme. 's attack on. snbstance9 is based on hi.s ep is temologi-
oal premise that ideas are the copies of impress 1ons .. 10 The 
idea ot substanee,. J:Iume argtJes, must be. d~l'ived from an 
impression of reflection, for no- sensation conveys the idea 
of substance. "But the impressions of reflection l"esolve 
themselves into onr passions and emotions; none of whioh 
ean poesibly represent a subatanee .. tt Hume conc11:des tbat 
------~--- -:----'-
- 1.. Objb v, VII~ Z{l-Z'f.2.. !his eJ:>itieism applies to ex-
tende-d su ·stance as well as thinking substance. 
·a. ;tb1d .. , VII, .. 276 • 
. ,. Ibid. , VII, ~85-286 .. 
4· Ibid. I VII. !91-292 .. 
5· See espect.illly Berkeleyt a. EPRK, 25-.33, 51-53, 57~ 150 • 
. o. ~e Wallaee ( tr- .. }-, LH, 273-276-
7· Perryts entire PPi'" is an argurr.ent against the tradi-
tional snbs tance view. 
a. Wb.itehes.d rejects the wtion of "'vaellOUS aetnaltty." 
PR, Viii- . 
9· Rnm.e owed a great deal to Berkeley in these arguments. 






t.l'bose whO opoose the Carte.aia.n fol'"mulation ot the 
primy dat"1m may be roughly divided into t'1Rt') gzooupst 
those who believe that Des~a.J>tes t s fol'mulation is iD o in-
clusive; and those who hold that 1 t is too exclusive. A 
ehi&f exl)on&nt or: the former- view is liume. By an idea. 
l!ume means ffthe faint 1mages of' [impressions] in thinking 
and t"ea.soning. ul 'fllinking and f".eeling, liume "~~rites, ean 
easUy be dist1ngu1shed~ 2 and it ia ·only of thinking that 
knowledge deals. PGr,. Jlutne writes, impressions lU.y be 
divided into two kinds,. tm~ of sensation. and 'those of 
.. 
IJefleetion. ·~e first kind aroise.s in the soul originally, 
fi-om unknown eauses. The seeor.td is derived, in a great 
imaSlll'e, from ideas. w3 '!hu:s, for Hume, the data of knowl-
edge are not the Whole of co·nsoiousnesSo, b·nt ratb.eP sensa-
tiona (sense-da.t.a f"rom the f:tTe senses). Jlbdern positivists 
agree with Rumer s analysis at this point,. tor the only ty-pe 
or empU.ice.l knowledge· which they will adm;i't is that whic,h 
. es.n be verif'ied by the se~es. 4. 
!he opoosit& view~ viz., that experience must be defined 
in. terms much widv than oonsaiO'tHBness; has been emphas1 zed 
by Dewey. Dewey's basic. contention is that consciousness 
-- ..... ----~------- .............. 
1. f!'llmell THB, I, See. 1. Sae suprai ·· ·B4;-85. , where this 
po-int is :also discussed.· 
2•. Ibid. 1 ~r. are,. llume admits, alme few expfi4"1ence:s 
where this distinction. is vague,. bnt nevw'fheless i.t -can be 
made. 
,. Ibid. " I, Sea. 11 .. 
4· !his is the well-known ttve:r-1t1ab111ty" theory or mean-
ing emphasized by the positivists. AJ.l statements-which can-
not be so ve:r-1fied are ":non-·sense• or •metaphysical. 11 l'o-r a 








a.ftirmation of individual eo:n:sciousn&$a.l 
·The philosophy. of Maleb~aneh-e, like that of' Spimza,. 
has. been ronsid~ed u the s:rstemat1~e.tion ot Cartesian 
p:Pincil)les by a ~O"fal.diaei:ple. lfalebranehe aoeeptf!ld Dea-
ca:r-tes' s ·prem.i~e that the· essence .of .the ael:r consist:S bply 
in. P.•se~s, 2 and these. are. tbfl ..ale t.ecU.a~& object. or the 
s.el:f.. Hilnc.e the prima:r,- datum 1!emain.d for Malebpan.ebe the 
llem& as.. tb.at O·f l>e~Jeart.es. re-t there is,. as. Blondel ha$ 
sho1m., an 1mplic1t ant1-Qarte!l·j.an~$m in Malebranohets 
tbought; tor "~seart.es at adossait a I~Ueu, sans jamats .1 • 
envisage~. -COlm8ft f1n1 po.or al.ler au mo:ndet lfalebl"a.nche 
tour-ne l& dos au monde pour trouvex- D1eu.•3 
!be trad1t1Qn of Bri~iah em.pir'~eia, wad especially 
in Loeke, .al.ao accepted the Cartesian px-1m&.ry' datum. . Loclce 
a:tat•• . eatego~amatieally that it 1a OJU.y ideas wh1eb are 
the· 1mediate obJect o:f 'knowledg-er4 and be aeee})ta De:s-
eat'tes-1 s deftn1t1o:n of the idea as that whioh 1• iatnediatel.y 
prese.~t in c¢na~iousnesa .. 5 Be alsO a:rgues, 1d. tb. Des-;.!Ji.tes, 
that tbe self .is knOwn with eel"'t-.inty and indubitableness; 6 
and b.f) takes r~m De•e~tes tha v1ew that pe:rfeet ·-.·. 
1. Ham.&! in writelll: •1a ~eeJ.ite de lt 1ndiv1du (et c•est 
a&.llS doute un ,.des mer-ites et 'tn11t des fo.rees d.u sy.sume} eut 
a! .t'ortement •tabl fe que J.a pctine est grande pour sortil!' de 
J.' 1nd1vidu. u . S:P, .20&:.: · · 
2~ !ikU.$b~a~he"' B(iH~herc!'le. I, 282-283. . 
3~ Ble~l, A:-t. n~16), 4-5"• 2his differ.a.ee issued in 
the theo:t-y of ar~ea.aional ~a:ases, 11b1J'h Mal.ebraaehe shared 
wi tb. Qeul in~~·.. Jlla1eb:ranche t a thought is diseussed again 
below, 136-137•c 
. 4· Locke:t BITT~ B}t,. IV, Cbap. IV, Sec. l (II~ 167 }. 
,,.. lbid.. . . . 
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pr-esentational :t~dia.ey t::ts. t such aan be te:s.ted. Rene$ 
it is necessar-y to oonel 'Jd& that it ts only th~ pr•hen-
sions: that are: rGfleeted in oonsa 1ou6ness that oan ael:'·ve 
as the primary datmn; s.nd that suah pre.hens1ons serve S.$ 
data fat> knowledge,, but cannot be taken aa vet'idloal 1n 
their _re.fe:renaa in themselves. De.seutea 1 s a:Pgu'l!lt.nt with"" 
stan~s Whitehead' a e:t'1:tie1ems:. 
A, dittt.tr&nt cr 1tie1sm of the Cartesian pl(lima.r'1 datum 
has been ~de by Arebb1shop TelllPl.e. '-'•le argues that 
the Cartesian •tl:tcd of doubt has only an illuaot7 l.ogi:<Je.l 
eogeooy, :and the 1/U!JSm:~a.nue to whieh D$sGartes olings is 
bnt psy®olo-g1aaJ. .. 1· .11Wbat Deso.utas indulged ill h1s stove . 
was pnr:ely ao:ademie ooubt, • f'ox-- what he oupt to bav~ 
reaohed .as .th• basis of al.l tbo,lght 1 inal.nding ®ubt 1 t-
self, was the subj$et""'objeot :relationship. ·2 Renee the 
only PO.!ltdbl~ ou:teo• of h1a p~oedm:•ec, 1'emple tt'!"gtt$S; is. 
sol1piii.sp),3 :tor tbis ·is the. r<itsult or ~n b.J'potbe&1s whioh. 
holds .that "the :ttdnd deal& direetly not with obJ•eta known. 
thro uljlout as O'b,jeeta" but wit:h its own ideas Whi4lh hav.- to 
be :rslated to ths real world by a sp.e~1al -.~t. Jt. Know~edge 
CUll'l thns b:o, Temple b(.)ld$1 of' ph&.t\OltliUJJl Onl:f· 5 
. ~e DIO'tiva.tion Ut1d&:r1y1ng. ~empl~"S CPitie1$118 iS that 
individual ~onsoio\l&n.&ss ia too :f~i~Bl' a 'basis up~n which · 
, ............. ~~;~-.-"~~:~~- . . 
1 •.. Templ•~ 1TIIGC;f. 64-.. 'ftds~ of eot:Jr~e, is the whole point 
ot the oogito (bfJ.for.e Gad is establiah(6d), and it is so be-· 
(jause everyth1~ elsa ea.n be ~bt~d .. 
2- ll>id. :t ,,;1' . . . . ' 
. ,... . l'bid .. " 68.. . 
4• I'b1d .. jf·· 71· !bis . is . the en-ol' ofl assuming "that. in 
knowledge the mind. begins. with itsal.t' and .Pl'Oeeeds .to. the 
s.l) r:eh.insion. of" tEe exte.riiiil 11Qrld b . wai · of· eon.s~~-,etion 
a. nfeP.ence~ !bid- , · 3· · 
. ;.. :Ibid. • 74· 
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to base knowledge; and 1t- is Atrtbority whioh must super'-
esde the Car-tesian individ,lal.ism.- 1 A very similfnT' motiva-
tion, al fuo1~h fX'Om an entil'ely different position, led 
the lfas1. B8hm to eriticize the Cartsstan argument.. Des-
cs.rtests tlhiloso-nhy 1.s termed by Bl5hm. •da~-antlee:Pte ttni-
verss.lismus; tt2 and he objects. •dass der Rationalisnms di11l 
Klarheit mit _d&r Wah:rhe:!t verweehselt .. "-' '1b.a oo.gito., he 
oontin-n•s, *'dass D$soar'tes am En.de dieses Weges gewinnt, 
2ie1gt den N'ulli>'tlnltt an;, unt.er den das abend1lndiseh& Wirk-
11ehlte1tsverhiJ.tnis nieh.t m&br sinken konnte • .4. But it. 
ts tweess~ to -pass \leyond; this Jhlll}?ttll1ft: 
. _ Die •ov5sse• D&searte$ '···• .• bEf.stebt dar in; dass 
er d&n Weg zu Ende ging~ der ~u Bnde g4gang&n sein 
musste, wenn hint~ dar> Welt der- 'V&rbPa.uchten - .. -. 
m:t1;telalte:rliche.n "Baal.itltsnu w:1l'klish ein 
:Ant~ gef'unden l!l'erden solltet D:ieht mehr in 
den ide~.l.en• Wil'-kl':tehlt$1 ten des Abecudlandes, 
abar .a,leh.-nieb,t._.i:$· wil'kliebke1tsl.o.aen •eoa1t9," 
soudern · in dar Grwidwirkli.Mke:1 t der dl.kis~hen 
.l)em•1nscha1't. d~flt. Realitlt und Idealitlt s•~ 
lll$1nse umti:Qgt .. '- · 
llh~se are the chief eritieisms Whieh ha.ve been made 
ot the Cartesian p.r:!mary- da:tum.. De111eatttes held that this 
datum is the certain ·and nen.ssary stU.tiug noint in the 
Jbaowledge situation. It remains,. ther-efore, to examine 
the vaQ1dity of· these .attaek:a. 
_1} ~e Cartes~.-n view of' the datum bas bElen attacked 
b-e-~a:ase it i~l1~~:t. e.& Pap says, that one emnot. get ~yond 
~~~~-~~~~-~~~--· 
. l,. i'eltlPle, Bill_, so~ 
2 ... . :ea.hm, Ae~. 45-56 .. 
'"... lb id. ' 46-4· lbid •. , 47·· 
5· Ibid., 5-7•. See also on this point 150, and indeed 
passim .. 
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the eirol~ or his ·1deas. 1 TJ&see.rtes did writ& that the 
idea ":n!est ja.m:a1s bore de 1 'entemem&uik •2 .And indeced, 
this has be&n a :f"r:eqnent attaek on rorDtUlation:s or the 
primary ds.t11l!l similar to DeseliJ!:'t&a' s. · Blan.shard, e. g." 
w:r-1tes that "we mttst $0 eonst:rue the 1rtn-'ld we f'irs.t liite 
in as to mak!_ase:a'(}e from it eonea1.vable; "' e.D.d Edg~ll .nu 
argtJed that '*knowledge b-y aequaintanQe". ean.not be the j.n1-
t1 s1. stage 1n knowledge be eause 8 :f';room 1 t there could 'b e no 
a:dvanece. ~ ib.e logioal :ra sult ·or th~ Cartesiq pril:allry 
da.tn:m, it is held~ is sol ips ism. 5 
But that Slleh a c~ge ean be ~aintained is vet-y 
doubt!"fll•, · For 7 f''1l."st, it oon!'tU!E~s ep:tstem:>logieal and 
metauhysfeal aa.tegoriest even if' one 1s millet is all that 
he knows and .all that he tl&a know 1 there is certainly no 
log1o whieh l~ads inmt&diatel.y to the ~l1eation tb.at his 
mind ll!{ all that there iS• If one aecep.ts the pF-&llda&- ot 
epist.em.ologieal moniSllt, the· ~l1e.at1on ean D$ JnB.de:; bu~ 
without 1t,6 and. on Cartesian premises,. the inference to 
so11p.sism is unwarl.'"·anted. The lo.gie.s.l :l'9Sul t {)ould be 
only a. tJ't'e of s.gnostietsm. 
· Yet $Ten this ia u'1an.Eteass~1f:. Alftl:ough one may :roe-
Je~t the Cartesian ttetsea;~H:l,. 0 it is still poea:ible through 
,-~---- .... ,-.. -:--.~-...-.- --· 
. l. . P!ip, ,lAP 1 1~. he his discmssion o£ epistemologieal.. 
·dualism from a p'0$1tiv1st1~ point or view, 119-l-48 .. 
. z. . ae~p.. I, n, A,. sa. . 
3• BlQ:Jh~? liT, .:r; 570; lf~41!'eal.iats also bold an e-· 
p1•t~:molog1eal ~$~ he, a.. &• 1 . the di.seuasion of Perry below,. 104/ ·· . 
. 4-'! · lt~•ll, Art. ( 1919), 19~-196. This rete~ee is ·Owed 
to Blans-bard. 
··~ .. _i;laa6artes pined ce~ta1n kmwledge of the external. 
\\IO:P-19. 1;b?:e~h God.. ·The prte:s-en.t di sen ssion QOn.tt~~rns onl:r 
the p~imary datum, boweve.r .. 
6.. ~,.. poi~t is suttmtarized below, · 102. 
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means of inference and inte:t>p!>etation of the data .in e;,n-
Seiollsnass, to deveiop hypo1hases of varying probability 
about the referents of ideas.. The implication of fuis. is 
that all knowledge, even of. the existence of objects, , is 
only probable; yet it does indlc$.te that the inference 
from the Cartesian datum to soltpsism 1a entirely unwar-
ranted. 
ii) Again, it is maintained that the snbject•object 
relation is the basi o relation, and that 'this shonld have 
been tl:e re s'1l t of Descartes's procedlJre. In a very real 
sense, Descartes accepted this, for all ideas contain "pos-
sible ex:istence; nl and further, he observed' tba t tb.e ~:mb­
ject-.object relation holds within c~nscionsness itself. 2 
Yet Descartes is right in balding that, while the subject 
of 1:h1s relationship is known indubitably, the object or 
the referent of .the acts of the subject are not 11given~ n 
F•1rthe1"more, argumm.ts to tm e:f:fect tba t it. is psychologi-
cally impossible to do11bt the s~bject-objeot relation a:roe 
quite :irrelevant;· the po·in:t. being whetmr the object can 
. . 
'be logically dOtlb~~d..? Renee, Descartes is correct in. 
assertirg that the· self' is the first certainty, and that 
the S11bject"!'object relat1Dn is derivat.iye. 
iii) That the being or existence of the cogito is a 
:fo;rmal op. abstract principle is a statement which needs 
examination. lf' ~t means fuat one must move beyond the 
. existence of the self to a metaphysical hypothesis, it is 
-~-----~-- ... --.--.. 
1.. See snpra,. 57. 
2. See supra, 54· 
3· . See the instructive nota, supra, 55, n. 6. 
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sJ.ty in this assTtion: it may he pose.d as. a logical t>O&-
sibility, btlt it is the dietates of experience which must. 
det.erll1ne whethe~ S'c'lQh a possibility has any probability• 
The Cartesian da.t,lm may lead to the "View that no objeet 1$ 
completely kmwn~ for krowledge abont any object must re-
main probable. Yet tber& is no fo ree to an argument whieh 
moves from this l':a~t to th$ nea4Jseary existe~& of .a Ding--
an-sfcb. 
v) Finally,. in r-&s~li!lt~{, it should be noted that it is 
against ev:lt:tei.sma Slleh as these that supporters o-f episte-
moJ.ogioal dualism h~1ve diracted much o~ their polem1.c. 
~rofesso:r :Sr<lghtman, e. g., &.Pgt18$ that epistamologieal 
dual ism; rather than being a ske-p_tio1sm, ·is j ~1st what knowl-
edge if!: ·W:nP!eas knowla·.ige of objects. tmt can neve~ be 
one with th& idea that knows th0l'I'J· is .po~sib1&1 then real . 
knowledge and: articulate axp~ierica itult" are alike impos-
s1.ble. "1 For example;9 it fs -pos:!rlblttt to ha?e s. ~ne ides. 
of a-"?.aat e<-vent,. with whi.c-b it is impossible for 1Ul'3' pras.ent 
i',dea. to be rnon1$tielitll'1 related.. Knowledge does; then, 
bP1dge the gap betw&en idea. and obje-:et in 
tWught without te.· possibUity. of tbs idea'$ 
evsr be.dflg on~ with ·the obje-u-t. All utietl-
late. UJ)er1eno.e r~st;s. on 11ueh refereno$s and 
relatio:~s betnen ~sent .and past alad fl!li;ur"$• 
Without a dual1 t7 ~f tbottght and object,. bowl-
edge cqnld not be. . , .- ... · ·. · 
"-~ ,.,. ............ .,~ ... -.·------'""'"--. 
. 1. Brightman, I'J!f,· SQ-81. Critical re_al:tsts apee wi~h 
personalis~$ on this p.oint. See Lovejoy1 t1 ver7 importan:t . 
hoek, llAD.. - · · .· . 
2·· ~ Br1~tman, ·I'f.Pt 81. Ar:Jatotelis.ns w<>ul'Cl agree tha'k 
th1a &lalism must exiat 1n order that k:rw:t:1edge· ea~ exist. 
Po-P an. argnl'llent ths.t Aristotle t s enistemlogy is in a. s&nse: 
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then thought eannot be p:i'op-erly said -to be meuta.l. 1 It 
Femains, then, to ex~Jm.ine the ct-itiGisms wh1Gh have been 
made of Descartes's assertions. 
3) Againat behavioristic views aueh as these of Hob--
bes and Watson, Descartes correctly pointed otTt that such 
a. coneeption of the idea is grossly 1n.adeqttate. First, 
Descarte-s wrote that a Fren-ehlr.ta.a and a. Germa!l eould :t10t, 
on Robbeat s vi-ew, have the same thoughts. about the same 
tllil!lg:- if the tho 1l!ht is the -word, and the words are dif-
ferent, then the thoughts Mll:St be different. Seeondl y, 
Dtuuut.Ptea indicated tbat tbe-r& is SQlltething ~ipifi&d by 
the wzoda whio:h is otbeP than the words tbemsel.ves. 2 In 
bath of th.Sae atat.emeuts, De.seartes 1 s vicni' is eorreet .. 
Very .similar ·argam.et1ts have '.b-een 1UI-&d by Blansh.ard 
against the bebav:iol"ism of Watson to show that it 1a impos-
sible tbat language and thGl'Jght are 1cieut1es.l. Blanahartt 
p~duces evidence to show -that ( l} l&.llgtlage may vary wbil.e, 
thollght,rema.ins the same:, (2) tb.ongbt may vary while lan-
guage :t-emains the same, ( 3 J 1al'lgll~s may be present while 
thonght is absent, and (4) thought may be present while 
lang1!!age 1$ absent. 3 It is, impossible, :Slansh~d concludes, 
to hold that thought is laJOguage :tlleebanism. Nor is it pos-
-"-1-·-.-.------r~. ~---~ 
1.. Aye.r, LTL,. 142. De$eartes did not limit the defini-
tion of llen~ee to. sen.se: it is the who-le of' eonseiousneas. 
It sb.o:Ul! be observed that these types of' arg'tDllents are 
strenges.t in Peferenee: to the se-nses, b t1t they ar-e. weakest 
(and b:reak down) in the diso:1:tssion o·f vaJ.nE!h 
2. : 1!!.. III, IX, A., 139• . . , 3· anshsrd, ft, I, 320-324· 
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is a.et1"J1ty. Bll·t this as&el't,ion,. 111 ~t•elt~ is 4enie<i by 
tew phUosopb&rs,. even. :ln th& sense t.ha.t the thepzaf1t1!i)al, 
l'eason senes the praet1ca1. 1 . ~inkitlg,. to be a.ure, 1s. 
tisd to l)raoticf1l aoti v1ty-.. But, and here Bylet s ta.ll4lysis 
is inColllPlete, iU:le nature O·f t.he theoretical li"IUtson. 12 ~t 
exba'l!tated by the praetical: in the dotyJ the m1lld ~· a 
apeo1~ and 'Qllique' :function of ~wins; and this tunetion 
e8Jltl.ot ba reduced tG the doims·· Where llyle 18 in e~ror 
is, as Blan,s~d: writes~ •aot in llis insiateJace tblt 
~ought is a meu:uut ,, but itt wha. t seem$ to us his p.wve~se 
refusal to: reeogn!ze tbat ~bonght has an end of 1 ta own.. •2 
And having s:neh. an end, it ean.mt be reciu:ceQ. to beh:a:v1oral 
a.eti vi ty. 3 
11) Again, Ryle t s ana1y.s1s is in.adttqtrate because _he 
dQes not_teke aeeotu~;t o'£ eerta1n experiences whieh ean be 
eo~n.eeiv~ only as m.~utal--to wh.ieh pb.ysieat ca~sories do 
-
not at. a.ll. apply'* T.b:& .fJutts t)f logiC)al. 1apl1eation, or 
meani:ng, or lll$l'J:l0ry, lm,ve ~o meaning when eo nstrued in. 
b$ha.v1oral. or J}>hya!eal terms ... hrther; eo.nseieuaness 1a 
not G10·nf"1ne.d to a siniJ.e, pr,esen.t.lDQmant:: .it is t:i.m$~ 
transeetldiilg• )}Q experien.e:.e 1n eo1:us-o1ous-n~ss exists. but 
that it n4is a duration;.· tor in the "sp.e~e1ous pr-&sent,tt, eon*" 
seiousn.ess transcends t'i.lQe b7 ~nl:t~ .·in. one self' certain 
----..-.-~..-----•:---.-
1.. Oft~c K8.I',tt• e. "prim.e.:ey or the pure praetie-al reason, • 
CPrR., 2_25-:_a._rt•· _Jir1at9t.el1a~~l. b.owever, would d&ny this 
p:rilnae.y. ,,Se.e- WUd, IBP, &l ~· 
2• Blushax-d, lf'l', I, 393·· Bl$nshard writes this of the 
pragmatiat; but it applies equaUy well here. . · 
,. ·. Deaeeteaf $ argume~ts ··~ ue-ver diP ectad against a 
c~itieis~ "Sll<ih as 1h1a; he fl.eeepte-(1. with tb.e a:o.eients ~·. 
view_ that the in telle.et hu a tune.t'!on ef its owno He did 
insist, however, .that mental processes cannot be red1Jced 
to behavior. See below, 119. 
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is not found alone~ for oonsciouenass is :not of this nature; 
mind is neither a p11re nnity nor a p~ diversity: it !s 
a 'Uni tas mul t~plex, as Stern aaid, for oonaoi oua states 
be-long tog$~er 1n a unique way.. In this reapeot items of 
oonseiousnese exist onl7 in the contax:t in whj.eh they oo-
enr. Deees.rte$ 1 $ argtllnent from the 1ndiv1sibUity of the 
of the soul is an attempt to make this poir:tt .. 1 Aa :Protes-
sor Brightman writes: 
Wb.ate'V'•r objee.ts Sll"e in the mind,. however 
diverse and. otherwise unrelated they ma:;r be, 
are genuinely related by the jr oompl'esenee 
in one mind.. Sel:f'hood, then,. is unity in 
variety,. the true s-ynthesis o.f the manifold .. 2 
iv) Jfor is Ryle 1 s ar.gutt$nt based on the dogma o% the 
Ghost in the ·Machine eon elusive. lJb be sure. Desea- testa 
pos1t:J.on on the l'llind•body problem is untenable; .3 but this 
problem cannot be solved DJel"ely by a. definition of mind as 
be.ba:-,ioral activity. A theory which leaves unexplained 
the relation or m-.nd and bo·dy must be re jeated; but a.nothez-
oannot be ;a.ecepted in its plaoe. if 1 t a ttea:pta an exp18.IlA-
t:Wn by denying the uniquel7 mental. existence of the mind.,· 
And it shonld be f"llt'ther PQinted out that all tl:l.e evidence 
tor beba'!Tior is conscious evidena&: the data ere all :tn 
eonse1 Otlsnes.s.. And i.t is Yd th this reality that an hllJOth-
esis of interaction most be formulated, and rot with a 
b~ha1rioral or physi-.1 e:risteneEt. 4 
----·-.-. ~-.... ..,.. __ .. _-
1. See supra,. 68. 
2" . Brightman.t IT?, 192. 
3· See· below~ 206-210. Scholasties~c while admitting that 
the .self' or intellect has the oharacteristies desoribed here, 
argue that the :so'll is W.b& substantial :f'o l"m' of 'the humau 
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very UeO&SS&l"7 DOt tO consider· the idea 8.8 an exact ·and 
·, 
intage-l ike representatiol;l or an objeot,. "'ear antrement 
11 n•y a:nll"Oit point de distinction entn l•tobjet et son 
image. al And he wr4te to Mer·senne that ttla fantaisie 
aorpozaelle·" does not deserve the nam.e of idee at all; 
tor by this latter term he- understood 11 tout ce qui eat 
dans nostre esprit~ lors q1.13·n.ous conoevons un& chose; de 
2 q11elqne manie.re que nous la eoncev1ons. '* · Deseartea did 
'QE~Jlieve that images &r$ present ·1n the :mind as it thinksj"3 
but the blage is not the whole of the idea~ and tbere are 
ima.gele$ s ideas. 4 
2• T'n.e: real.1yY' of ideaa.. Amona 'the various ideas 
which Deso~tes had, be noticed that, in considering them 
only as modes of thought, there la no difference or in-· 
equality a~ng them; but 1~ considering them. as represent-
ing one thing. or another,. there ls a very great difference. 5 
1'his d1ttel'ence in ihe "realitytt o:r ideas. is for Descartes 
one between the· reality of tb& idea as it exists in the 
res o:ogitans, or its .estre formel; and the .reality of tJ::e 
1.dea aa it is re-presentative of an object" or its realite 
objective"' By the objeotive6 raality or an idea, then, 
--~·~--~ -----~~~ 
1.. · Diop., . VI, 112-113· Sensible images, while pre&ent, 
Dei:JQar'bea•nites, do not need to rt;lsemble QbjQcts at all. 
See ibid., VIt III. cr. Med:. •rt a1 SOU'Ii'.ent X"elllfU>QUfh. qut 
11 y avo it une grande. diff$l'"~n~ en~ l'objet et son idee." 
IX, A, ,1.. · 
2. To Mers:enne (J'nl7, 1641), I!I" 392-393· 
3• See. )lis empl:tasia on the use of' dil\grams and othex- such 
aid" to the- '~'lnderstandi~ in the. Resulae. 
4'!1 These :latte-r, e .. g~, of tl:!e sohl, are known by a pure 
"inspeetio~. ot the soul~ *!his problem is. t:reated 1.n Schlvarz" 
Art .. ( 1896), 464-465 • 
5• M:edo., IX, A, 31 ... 
6. M1as Calkins points ont that the term 1fobjeet1ve tt in 
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:fl."a~er :nostre espPit?"1 !t follows trom this that the 
objeativ·e :tteality or ideas varies; and Deae.artes. 1 s ·con~ · 
el11s:ton .is, n<l'elles qui tne .. representant des substane:es.,. 
sont sans do ute quelqm~ chose de plus,· at aontienne.nt. •• 
plus de realite objective; n 1.. $,.." "'putieipent pal"· :Pa'"" 
PP~sentat1on a pl~$ da degr~z d1 es.tr& ou. & paPteetion 
que· c&lles qui mo represe.ntent s~ulemen. t des ·trodea ou 
ane idens* "~ 
. . . -. . . . .. . . 
,.. The theory ot innatce id~.as- The third type or 
c~tesian :idea, end in many :r:otHlpects the mat important 
. . 
:tor :O.s:e&rt&s' $ m.eta'Physiee~ is the. innate. idea. In the 
Diseours, he MN>te that: he had "~~ue. c·eriaines loix, 
que Dietl a telle•ent a-stablies an la. ll&.ture, et dont 11 
. . - . . 
a :bnpri~ de tellaa lll)tions en nos. :ames. •3 ~se no tiona 
aPe the ~1m:pl e el•men ts wh1oh analys.1s di seovel".s,. and 
which lie t~;t the ba-s 1$ o t all k~wledge .. 4 ~s Jtamel in 
. . 
~ites~ "on potl~ait d~e CJ:t:ti· ~· Ji&.tuJ?e simple, ~test ll 
atom~ tit ~vid.enee•" But, l!lameli,n.-QQnt1nues, osra must be 
taken. not tO .c.on.st:rue the s 1m:ole na~llt"ea in a psycholog1-
eal way: "la ~ature simple est llindivi.sible dans une 
/. •· t . "'' ' pensee de dro·it; ~e n. • as. pas qui 'Par ai t, a tcu t ou a 
~aiSon~ i~diV1~.1ble a 11ne peiUl~ .'qlifi:1aon.qtifk •5 These 
--~----":'"",.,~-,..&t-.-,~'filjjo>~,· 
. 1• . . ~&sp• -II_; IX,. A, 107• _ . . . . . 
2• tltlld.-, IX~ A, 31 .... 32• Cl*1t1C~tsm of tbes. · ·C~t•s1e.n 
views,. 1n .... ~o t~ a.s they relat_e to .. th~ problem or this 
chapter'* are -ax!lmin.ed<below.;. · · 
3• Dise.- ~ VI~ 4.1• .. cr._ P:r:--inc .. , I, 47,. IX, B,. 47 • 
4• Se• a:op!fa, 44-46 •. serrua wri~s: ifJia.is las 1nttJ1-
tio~s si~les. qui sont le po~f; de depart de la syn.thesis 
son-t . ~nue~ll par l t ansl.yae. • ¥1:)1?, -19. 
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premise is aee &pted,, then Gass endi f II po 1n t is .not at all 
rel.evant.1 The seoond obJection was made by APnanld.. 
Arnauld believed tba.t ·there u J'lune manifeste oontradie;_ 
tion que qnelque qhose soit par soi positiveuu;nt et comma 
PB.l" lll!le eause; tt2 the existence of ao.meihing whieh is the 
cause ot itself, 'and. ·which ereates itself, is absurd. 3 
Descartes ans:Wered. this er11d.e1slll by 1n,d1eattng that Ar-
nauld bS,d misunderstood his uae of the term par soi; its 
meanmg ·is. ttco·mme par une e•use for~elle, c.' est tl dire, 
pa.ree qnlll a. Un.e telle.nat\'lre qutil n.fa pas.besoin de 
.eause effieiente .. tt~ 
In map.y respeets~ th1s arg'tlment is sj,lldlar to th~ 
· t~ad,.tions.l.. 1fcosmOlOg1o~ ft a%'8)lm&Ut1. 01". ~gDtnel;l.t f"rom. et·- . 
. r·i·o.ie~t causation~ 5. N'evel-th:e)._e~s, tl\et'"e 9l:'e several impor-
tpt dit'fe~.neea )n the {1artes,ian argumen:i!. 6 First" Aqu.~a 
. began w11;h soae sen.a1b1e objeet and as$1gne(i God as its.· 
ea:a:se. lftl.e eosi to, bowevE'r, sea.rehed t;hEJ 1ntEn-ior of' 
· thought itself', and argued that God is its cau&&.7 Seeoll&Uy, 
,...__-IGii:...,.· ... - ........ --~,_,--.... . 
1. at· V, . VII, 3b9;,..~7l, , 
2· IV, IX, A, 162. 
?" d., IX, A, 164~ lfor., eontinU.ed Arnauld, is sel.f-
ereation by God necessary, tor Go'd d,oits not exist in til2Ut, 
but rather aterna1ly'" 4• <Re!p* IV, U, A, 1.84,.. Cf. Prine.. I., 5l.: tt~ propre-: 
llent lJa:t" s~, ll n'y a. que. Dieu qui, s·oit tel, et U n'y a 
·· atHlune ehost) . .Qreee qui puisae exif!f·ter un !Jeul l'i!Oment sans 
sstre so~stenul et conservee par sa ~u1ssanoe." iX, B, 47· 
5· 1h1s is ·the second or the 'Ihomi stic proofs. See s.. 1'., 
I, Q. 2, A •. · 3· · . . 
.· 6. See Gilson, Dfte, 724-326.. . T-o~~ liiD, pass 1m, con-
tains man:y refel'ettees to the similarities: and dii'fel'enees 
in the Cartesian pl"'ofs aa«1 the scholastic .. 
7• .· C~. Brurisehvi~S: ttetest mains l'hol11lhe que Dieu,. pl.us 
exae.te:ment. etest ltUl.e hm.name en tant que Die11, ps.r son. 
idee, est interieurement p:resent a ee·tte ame .• " RJ), 33· 
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fu.e Th.Olt1iat1e tbeol."y :is basecl on the Aristo:t&lian view· 
or the b1»rarchy ot forma; J)s.s~arte$ ~ejected the no.tion 
ot tol'lllS, however, 1 and hence, 1n the sensible wo:v:l.d, an 
11:lfini te regr-eH~:• 1s pG•ttsible.4 Tb.1Fdly,. Ileseartes be.,. 
lieved that the Tb.amiatie argtiDlen t. :prov-es. only tb.$ 
existence o.f $.Il author ot til~ universe, fl!ld. not the ex-
1at&nce· :>r a GQa::·3 f'ol" the eetnai"ble worl.:d !s imperfect 
an~ eontingent., and to -px-ov• 1ttat it has an authoP does-__ 
not -prove the pe»fe~tio:n ot e divine be1ng·4 It is tor 
these "asons tba t Desoal\te~ wa.s ·l~d to _~jeet thlt tPa-
ditionL.t arg1lln&nt, and to bas• his own on the !dea or 
perfection itself. 
3· Tha ontological li:Wgument.. The third ~8'llilent, 
itt c-ontrast to t1:te p:reeeding two which argue t~rom e:ff'eots, 
is one based on tb.e essence of Go-d. uL,•'e:xistenc.e de Dieu, n 
. . 
Dese&Pte'a wrote, "se .aonno:i$t ·d$ la seule: oonaid•:r.-ation de 
sa nat,1l"et n5 and it is towwd this'. ~nd that Dese~tes' a 
1. See. slll)ra·, 32:-33,.' 
z. · !b.ls !s a. c.ont~ast;J ot eou-:x-se, betwe-en the finite 
world of Thomi:sm and the· .u1nde.t1nita" wo:r-ld of' Descartes •. 
See ·sup1?-a1: 143, n~· 3· . . . . -3•' Of• Jt$ntt $!- l'"Gl:mOk On the argtlll18nt f'ro.-m 4ea1gn: ;pl>e~: 
Beweis konnte also b!ehstens-- einen WeltbauUte1ster* d&l* durt>h 
die 'f&uglicbkeit des Stotf'a, den er b~ult;o~1t&t:r immer $ebr_ · 
eingesebrmkt wire,. abe;r ninht .-~P. Weltatl'bBpf':eR ,. dessen 
ldee alles unterwortel). il.l~, dart.un. • l:rV ~ B655 .. · -
· · 4· · Itrd&&d, as Gilson mtes, unless. Des(}artes do•s. p_rov• 
the existence of a per.f'eet: ,B&iOf, be has not .d&.stroyed. the 
h'JpOtl:iellliS' of the ftll!alfn a•nie. DMTC, 326. 
· 5· ·Real); II, Prop. I, U; A, 129. Descartes's wgument 
ia given _ re . t .in the ·nis~ (VI,. ;6J .. the fPine. (I, 14:,: :rx, 
B~ · 31 ) , and the Jle d.. Th• 1 a tter: aoe ount is eh!e:tly f'oll.ow&d 
he%?'$~ '-'he ehiat"drt'fe:r>tula& , in t..be·s:e exposition of· the a~umen t 
1s.1 as Marita.in notes (DOD, 211, n. 148),. that i.u _'the Ked. 
tM · argm.nt 1$ tou~ud on the idea of the in:fin:lte., wli'Ire in 
the Prme .... it is based on the id&a or- ihe pe'Pt&et .. 
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•ontological w: argument is aim.ed. 
. ' . 
An idea is tr oe, Descarte~ held, in proportion to 
the extent to which it can be clearly _and distinctly per-
ceived;_ and the. idea of God which he has is "la plus vra.ie, 
1~ plus claire et la plus distmcte de toutes eelles qni 
sont en non esprit. • 1 Such an idea could not be a mere 
negation of the :finite,. for indeed. this idea contains·· 
«ol;)ject1yely11 more reality than any .finite be_ing. ~ Is it 
not possible, Descartes asked, to get a proof for God's 
existence from this fact? He wrote: 
Oar, ayant a.ceottstume dans toutes lea autres 
choses de faire distinction entre l 1 ex:1stence 
et 1 1 essenee, je me persuade aisement que 1 1 
exia.tence peut estre sepa.ree de 1 1essence de 
Dieu, et qu' a.1n.si on peut oonoevoir Dieu com-
me n'e:stant pas actuellement. Mais, neant-
moins, lorsque j 'Y pense avec plus d 1 attention, 
je trouve .manifeatement que 1 'existence ne peut 
non plus estre separee de l'essence de Dieu, 
que de 1 1esaence d 1 un triangle rectiligne la 
grandeur de ses trois angles ega.ux Q deux dro its, 
ou bien de 1' idee d' une montagne 1' idee d rune 
va.lee; en sorte qu 1 il n'y a pas mains de re-
pubnance de concevoir un: Dieu ( c I est a dire un 
estre souverainement parfait) a.uquel manque 1 1 
existence ( c'eat a dire auquel manque quelque .. 
per:rection), que d~ ooneevo!r uns montagne qutf 
nta.it potn.t de valee. 3 
Possible existence, ·Descartes. held, belongs to any object 
o:r tho,,ght, but it is only to an infinitely perf'ec:t being 
that existenoce appertains with necessity .. 4 Nor is i.t 
merely his thmking the idea that impo ~es on the idea o:f 
1. Mad., IX, A, 3T· 
2· Ibrd., IX, A, 36. 
3· Ibi_d~, IX, A, 52· 
is rape ate d both 1n the 
See also supra, 150-151. 
The ill us tra t ion. o.f the triangle 
Disch (VI, 36) and the Prine. (I, 14 IX, B, 31 ) • · 4. Med., IX, A, 54: •je ne s9a.vo1rs ooncevoir autre 
chose. que Dieu seul, a l' essence de laquelle 1' existence 
a:ppartienne avec necessite." cr. Priric. I, 15, IX, B, 31. 
.. perf'eetion the li~eeaaaey existEmce of ita obje0t: on the. 
eontJ:tary~. it is the neaeuud ty of the· ob~eet itself whieb 
d&tsrmi~a his thought to aoneeivs 1t."1• Thus,. as Adam · · 
s~arize.s the ai-gnment,. 1n a triangle tle p:tJopert.ies are 
d&due)ed necieasarily from its essenee. and ft.et':1nition; and~. 
in the case or a perftre.t being, tton pent daduire de meme 
les "P&rf'ea:1dons: Q.e cet Etre,. a C'Omllleno·er pal* la pr.emie~e 
de tthlte81. 1 'ex is tenee .. ,_~t2 
The f'irst eritical r--eaetion to 'til iS• ai"gmaent was made 
b7 Caterns, W:lO pointed o-ut a o~tain :resemblance Of the 
Car:t~sian.ruogu•nt to that of' St .. Ans-el.m.3 Anselm had 
a'r'gued tba. t.: . 
It is possible to ooneaive of a being '11h1oh 
cannot be oonoei'VIi!d Xlat ·to e~iaq and this is 
pa.ate.r-· than on.e.llhich- ean b., oonca.ived not . 
to ;a.x1st" Renee, it t~t, thaa whioh nothing 
greater Call. be nonol!lived, ea.n be ·conceived not 
· to ex:blt., it is not that~ than whieh nothing 
~JS;at~ ·can be· e.ehe:t!liVfld~ But this is an 1r-
reconeilal;)1e eont-radiotion""· There is 1 theut 
so ~1ily a be:tng than which nothing great&l"' 
ean be eoneaiv-ed. to exist,. that it oanno t eve~ 
be cone$1ved not to -e+Cist; and thia being tbon 
art,. 0 Lord, our Go4.4- · 
But st1oh an axrgumentt Cate~ua ~ont!xl.ued~ had been Hjeot4d 
bf st~ Thomas, whO wgued that the ~amae11.t pr-e$ttpp-oses ~ 
adeq\1ate k'noWl$dge of' the divine etHMtncu~q 5 lfbe &.Pgu~n:t 
proves. only, sai.d ~-.as, that what th& n8.l'l:le sign1£ies. ex7 
1.. Ked.., IX, A, 53!" 
2. ll'int, VD;, 321• CJ!'. Jiled. ~ IX, A" 53· 
3• Obj.. !, IX" AA 78-7~ 
· 4· liiiellli;. PRO, o-9· S.e GaunUots. !"eply, IBP\ 150~ 
wb.tch is -ssential!ty an attaek O'fl tbe realistic -premiSEtiJ 
which Anselm• s JUi>gument ass~s. I~ lbould be_ pointed out,. 
howeve:Pt that Gaunilo-1 s "Is·land"' m'Usea the point of the 
argument.; fo:P 1he argununt ~11$s only tQ. tbe infinitely 
pex-teet, or- God. · · 




two objea:tions a:re antie1pat1ons ·of :rnor& d&velopad argulW:imta 
made by Le ~~niz 4.tld. Kant. 
The criticism at l4ibniz: lBB.J be a:tnrply sta.te:ru be .. 
tween the idea o:f God and the e~is. tence of God. is til thir-d 
term~ vis. estu:incul; and until the essa.nee baa been shown 
to be ,.possible"', 1 .. e. • without. .eont:radiction, the o:ri.to~ 
logical proof does not establish the being of God9 
Sed omnissa pe:rofeotione aut nuagnitudin.e potuisset 
formari srgu•ntat!o adhu(} prop1oP strictio:rque 
hoc mod.Qt Ens nec&atut.rium &x1st1t (seu F;ns de 
eu1us Eastm t1.a. es'b Exist entia,. s.ive Ens a se ex ... · 
.. lsti.t),. ut ex terminiS pot&t.. Jam Deus eat Ens 
tal.& {ex De1 definition&), ·Ergo neua $:a:1st1t. 
Haec. arguments. procedunt, s:i moro coneedatur Ens 
perf'e.etissilJlum a$:~l Sns neoeasar1um esse possible, 
ne~ .impl.icars eont~adi~tionem, vel quod idea e$t., 
pqs.aiblile:m .ease esse~ ism ex qua sequ«.tur ex is-· 
tenth\.,. Sed quamdiu pos.sil>llitas iata non e:st. 
demons.t~at.a~ utiqu$ nee Dei ex1stent1.$.Dl tali 
argUlUJnto perf$nt$' dsmonstr.atam esse putandum 
sst.l . . · . 
Leibniz held tb.at .Deacal'i'tes had not ~$a:tiaf1ad. .,:thjs eondi-
. . 
·tion. 2 Le.1btliz himsflflf,. bowev~r 7 thought. that :tt is 
suff1.eif:tnt to p:t'OVe that God 6Xi&ts if tba idea of' God is . · 
.... -: - "' .,. . 
shown to be. l)-ossiblat. and his G~ll. v.e:t';.sion of t.bs ontol.og~ 
'leal, argmJ'leQ;t proceeds in this. way. 3 
:as.n~quin bas. examined; e.aroefull1' this critique h~ 
!A:ibniz, and eo·nell1des that it is ~ t a.pplieabl& to the 
·Cartes ian view. Le~bniz himself. 1n establishing his. 
~~ ............. 40'·~-~~ ~~-....,;· 
· 1..- Le.tbn1z,. APC1 I-c, 359• . . · 2.. To xxx, ti, q.b5.. Koyra points out that' St~ Bonaven•~ 
· tu:t>e" before Descartes and Leibniz_.. had •!ready· analyzed 
·the logical sti>nature of .tb.,e a:rgunun t into 1 ts two pal"ts: 
l) GtJ;d is possibl.e, and 2). the. 1d-ea ·or God implies hi$· .a~-
. ~stano&" , See his $ID11 1931~ and the :roe:ferenees th~e. . . · 
. 3• ~ See To ·Madame xxx, Iv, 294; and To nx,. IV, l'-01~04. 
'1\,000;, Art• (1696},. is a very inte~&stillg study of Vifl~}.s,;: 
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cqnsidered the will to be man• a g~ea test perfectio-n, :fo~ 
"ctest e1le .princ:ripa.lem.ent qui me :fait oonnoistr& qui je 
-porte 1' image et la -re sseniblance. de Dieu. nl !he per>fect1on 
of the will lies ebiefly 1n ·its freedom whieh, Descartes 
l:leld, does not need to be proved; for the experience of' 
willing is s-ufficient to p:rova that man has it. 2 !he 
:freedom and -perfection of the wlll a:r-.e snch that it is mueh 
:mor-e ex; tended than the 11nde:rstanding; and it is for this 
rea. son _that man errs:-' 
Ctf.u~t *. S9avo1r> de cela .seul que, la 
volont& estant beaucoup pl.us ample et plus 
etendul que 1 tentendement, je ne le. oon-
tiens pas dans les mesmes 11:mites, mais 
que je l'·estene aruasi an.x ehoses q1Je je .nt 
entens pas; ansqt.uilles estant de foi indif-
f'erente., ell& s'.ge:re fort a.isement, -$-t 
cho 1s1t le mal pour le bien, 0\1 le raux 
. pOUi" l• vrai.. 01' Q.Ui fa~'{; q'l.lS je lJl$ ~mpe: 
et. que- .je peehe. 4 . 
Yet the :fact that the will can nevertheless err must not· 
be attributed positively to the Creator; tor the privation 
J..., Ked.~· IX:, A~ 45· Despite, a certain similat-it}" between 
the human and divine will, Kop:oe notes an important dif'fer-
enee: ffLa volonte humain est au eo:p:waire, ·n&eessairement-
determinee par la l!'aison; tine grande lumiere des 1 'ente.nde-
ment produit neeessairem.ent une torte inclination de la 
volon-t' et la. els.Pte ~bsolne, 11; eonnaissanoe absolnment 
claire et distmcte determine neoessa.irement un act de l.a 
-.o lonte l'l:omaine .. tt _ EID, 26. · . 
2. ~inc .. I; 39, !X, B, 41; Qf. To Elizabeth {l'ov .. 3., 
1645 h "Iii a:, ·eomme la -connoissanee de 1. t existence de Dieu 
ne DO'!.lS: doit pas empe.seher d•·e&t.Pe ass~1r:>ez de .nostre l.ibre 
arb1tH,- pour ce q\1e nous 1 'exper1:ineo.t()n$ e-t le sentons en 
nous m.esmu!;. ainsi eelles de: n.os.tre libx-e arbitre ne- nons 
do it point faire douter de 1 'exiatenae de D1eu. tt IVt 332-
333"' . . 
3- . f:rin.o.· I, 35_, lX, ll, 4o~ FOr· otbitr· references on thi~J 
view, s• ·!o Regit1S Olay. 24.t 1640), III, 65; _1b ller'aenne · 
(Dee*, 1640), lli, 259; To P.. lrtesls.nd (M.e.y 2, 1.644), IV, 
J.l5~ll9; __ and Resp. V ~ VII, 376-378.; · 













IJ,l'l8l.ys is of the terms of the propoai tiotk Without StlOh 
ahal.ya1s, eontraX7 p:r>opositions may be intuited as both 
true.. Heme, Le1bn.iz continued, it is necessary to add . 
one more factor- to It,· eri ter-ioD -of' ~uth, Tiz. adequacy. 
CU18 vero id omn.e quod notitiu dlst1nctam 
ingr&ditur~ rursus distinct& eognitum est, 
seu O\':t'm ana.l.yeis ad r1nem. usque pro-duet& 
habetur, . eogni'Uio est adaquata, cuius ex&m-
plt~m perfeetum neseio an homines dare "os-
sint .. l 
Thus, Leibnis arguad that, while intuition is an im-
po.vtant part of the eriterion or truth,. 1t 1s insnffioient: 
for intuited propos it ions. may be aecept-ed as true before 
the¥ have been sufi"ici&ntl7 analyzGd.. The relations of 
Leil:m1z' s argu~.n:t l!Ul7 be s'Ul'Dlllarised 1n the following table: 2 
Xnowledge iObsc. ·w-e <neAP {Oonf'uaed 
loia.tinot 
deq,ate 
quat& } Pe:r-feot 
n1t1ve 
ymboli~ 
Th$. point of Leibtt:t.zts. &.l'gument is that in'iu1'&1oa tUl de.rmed 
by- De.so.arte.s is not a valid el"'iterion or truth beaause it 
omits analysis. lt may be questioned 1.f Leibnie did nQt 
~et.ain too muah of tl:e intui t1ve3 and 8!Ulytie in b.ia eon-
~·-- .... --.-.- ----~--
1.. Leibniz, XCVI,. IX, 422.-423· Note tba t 1n thia work 
Leibniz al.G-O di~tilaguiahed "red tie.tilait 1on• t~om 11nominal 
definitiotll" tha !'orme.l" being a. dat1A11iion ot a. being which 
is •posaib1th" lie appl.ied this 41at1netdon. to Desear-t.ests · 
oon.""'tion ot God. See aup:ra, 164.. riominal aef'm1t1or:ua are 
in the realm or symboliQ;.lmowledge-.. .. 
·Hegel. also took the notion of adequa.ey as the o.Pitfrion 
of tl!'Uth. See Wallae.e (U.. ) • LH, 121-127, '!or Begel 1 s dia-
etts.s:lon or tntu1 tion.. . 
2- ·. · Taken f:POm Bap:1es.: { tr. ) , P m:.. 424· 
3· Leibniz, EVI: "cognitionem vooo intuitivam. tt IV, 
423· 
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- ~c... ' 
eeption; ye'i- he Gtid po int out;. the inadequa~i& s o~ a. purely 
intuitional criterion .. 
V.an.y other- thinkers hflve attacked Desea~test s pos1 tion 
because of the ma them&tiaal. naturt'l of his ·or-1 te:riotl!> Por .,. 
as G1laon points o·nt" ft~a veritable ::r;ooifvolntion aaPtesienne• 
is .the reatl"'io.tion or th& 'Wdr-d•true• only to tb.ose proposi-
tiOll.$ ()f' a mathematiol!l:.l tytH:t.l But s:ueb. a eri tePion is 
theught to be inadequate to expEtrience.. Kahn writes that no 
matter bow clear· and distinct ideas axte, thay do not guaran-
te$ that. the_ f'aet$ to wh:t'eh the7 x-.e:t"el' exist, ttB.lld.., theref'or&, 
a mathemat:tcal. -method can nevezt- aolve an :&xis.tential problem • .-2 
Serr'lls_ also eompl,a:tns that Descartes has forced a. mathematical 
:method to apply to trad1tio.nal. metaphysical principles,. •nne 
methode matb.ematique qni 1).6 a:ppliq'tla.it avec afficaeit& qu' 
au:x: o'bjets mathematiqnes. ttJ The •l':tdene$ which Serrna gives 
is thatt 1.) mathematics ia not able to make a jndgm&nt o£ 
attribut1on or o-f existence; 2) it does not pose the prob ... 
lem- or a c:r1teP1on o:r tx-utb; ,3} it iS. indif:f·erent to the ,ob..._ 
jeGtiv:e truth o.f _its axio:ras; and 4> the princi.pl.es which it·.-
admits e..re concerned only w:tth relations ~d possible ope!»& ... 
t1ona•4 
These argtll'll&nts which Serrus gives about mathematics_, 
...................... _~..,_ ..... ..-..:~f'-'4·--~~- . 
l• Gi~son, D'-·!PC:t 201•- Cf~o Reg1llae IV~ X, 37.3""374• Hence 
the exelus!on of th& p;robaQle 'S,- Descar-tes. See eupra_, 23. 
2• Kahn, ft!S!'D, .26• Deseart.s ·of course recognizes this1 for God makes the existential gua.rant$e., Bt1t it his God . · 
hypoth&sis 1a not proved; Ks.llnt-s ·c:ri.t1eism has force.-· 
3~: Serrna, · MDD, l2l• _ . . .· . 
4•_ -Ibid.~: 118.. See .erimila.r a:rg-nmenta in Cbavaliezo, DES, 
l9l .... 192; _and. f. o. r-.sl.ightly. · dif'ferdJn t azogmnents,_ but ·to the . 
SliUite- effec-t, V~:t teh t tr., ed. ), MIIPD, 40. . 
and his general theory of a.t:Ully;sis md synthesis waa •n at-
't$mpt to make tb.e ·~theJ~atieal meth~d exp11eit.. 1 _ But De~­
eat!"tes .al.so saw that h1a ma:laematiea.l. a thed did f"all. heir 
. . 
to such .criticisms aa the:ee1 un:lesa he ec-uld eeta'blish the 
.. . .·· . . . . - . . . ·. ~ 
e.xistence of' a kd wb.o would su~te& his e:rtt;er.ton.. 
2. God and the or-ite:r!on or tJ?'D'th,. ~op1~1ng aueb. 
~iti<d.sms as tba:ae whioh m'-ght be. mlda against hi$ <witr 
r1on,-' Des<ts.rteS:- held that the e.riiel"fon of clesr and dis.-
t1nct 1d•s.s is s:tUl doubttul; and, aa lialJl$11n. says" "'lln 
s•oond er1~r1um;t! eelui de la v.Sraeite divine" vient le 
aonfirliHU'~ 1t4 l>$$esrte:a 11rots that after he: had r$CO£Cn1zed · 
that God exists, that all. things depend on him, and tba:& 
he 1& :tJQ. d.eoe1Y8r1 ·e.v&.J7\il:l1ng wh13ll itt ~l-earl7 and dis-
tinetly conoe:tve.d tQ 'be ~1e must surelJ' b-& so. 5 For- it' 
is thOse things whiCh ~· so oone&1Ted which .am: able "de 
me· p~au~der enti&"ment .. "'' · !h~ref'or•· Dasca:Ptes took •• 
~enain that 
l· .· ..See supra;; 44-46. 
1!. !be point being lila~ h•r• 1~ that f)&1tell1"tes was in ..... 
tanally oO:WJist&nt ».t la,a~rt1 althougb_ tn.._ er1t1eisms •. de-
above do: ne~tb.eleas apply ne.eau.se, as h" been •bown, . 
Oe-sciap'tes d1d n.o$ establish God•a e.xiat$-noe.. See supra, 
172.. 111sa Cel.k1ns bel.i$ves th4a.t el.eal'"tl.&as and dist.inet;nea.t~ 
.are inadeqnate to p-r-ov• God' a e-xist&~C1t ~van ® the car-
teais,.n preltd~ee. P:PP $ 4t-45~ · 
,3!0 · Se9- P:~rmo. 1, 5: ·. Poul:"quoi en p:&~t ausai muter u& 
detUOUStratio-ns d& tCaa.th..--.tique-. • IX, B1- z6•:t'(. 
4• Ha1i1$l.:tn., SD, 1>8• · 
· 5•.. ~·; J.X, A, 55• ·.Ct. ibid: •Et P~lld.~nt, poure~ 
que J• s.r;ay que toutes lee el:.w'ses que je t10Bf9.i ela1rement 
~t dist1net&lr.lent, peuvant est" pl."Qd'tli.tas par Di~u telle.s 
q11e je liUL ~n,oi1 11 snt'f"it que je· puia.se S:nee.vo !p -ela.:tre.-
m&l\t e·_t· li1s"t1ne:t.-nt tm.e chese s41ns '1:1Q autN,, pour etrtre 
~~1la1n que l r.u9 ~$t 418t1n:~w on dif'f'e~e.nt& u 1 tavtre.1t 
lX~ A,. &2.. . 
(). Ibid .. ~- IX~ A, 54· 
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itsel:f: eogito 1 er~ sum Descartes believed to be the 
tirst certain:t,- because, it iS held, 1 it is established 
by a clear and distinct. pe:reeption.. But it is not truly 
a certainty because it: assumes the validity of his crite-
rion or -trut~ In the ff:t'tst form,. this objection was made 
'by Arn.a.:uld and Gassendi. 2 In response to Arl1&uld, Des,._ 
cartes wrote that he was not in a "eirolett because be was 
assul'i"ed o t God t a ex isten.ee by examining the reasons by 
which his existence is proved; but atte:r God is est,ablishe,d, 
it is sufficieut for t~uth to eoneeive something el~uarly and 
distinctly .. ~ Mersenne objeeted to the certainty of the 
cogito: 1f' Descartes could :not p:rove anything with ctrti-
tltde until God is established, he oannot be certain of his 
own ~xistenc;e. 4 And there :n.ave been many others co have 
argued that Descartes did commit a petitio hel'th Xahn, 5 
U'eberweg, 6 Oaird., 1 and Templ.ea agr• with ltari tain •hen he 
writes that "1t seems to ua 1l3lp0ssible for Descartes to 
avoid the reproach ot reasoning in a vicious circle. •9 
'!hat such a cirele eXists, howevw, is very dubious; 
and, as Salmon bas pointed out,_ it seems almost psyeholO:gi-
-----·--~..,.---..--~ 
1· It: should be DOted hera that thia cr1 tic: ism is a mis-
interpreta..taon of the eogito:: the eogito: is known by an 
expePienee o!' implication, and does not px. suppose the tz-uth 
ot Descar-tes's criterion. See sup:ra, 73-74 • The criterion 
is der.:Wed from the eogito. This point is :rererre.d to again 
bel.ow 199· · , 
'2• ObJ.. IV, lX, A, 166; and Obj. V (French), IX, A, 211. 
~· =·~.s . IV, IX, ... A, 190. . 4• Ob ·.. II, IX, A, 98-99 .. 
5· a · , MSID, 22. . 
b.. lJeberweg,. BP, ll, 50~ 
7· Ca:il"d, ELP, II, 289. OaiPd speaks especially o:f the 
oonseiousness of God a:s pr-iOr to the oonseiou.sne.ss of' s,el.f. 
8. 4J!emple, BMG, 67 .. 


















B I B L I 0 G ~R A P H Y I 
Bibliography I contains the works of Descartes used 
in this dissertation; Bibliography II lists the secondary 
SOlJX"Ces and other re:rerence-s. .. 
'fbroughout the body of the dissertation, books and 
articles have been referred to by the authort s last name, 
the standar,d abbreviation" and the page number. In the 
case of Descartes • s writings, however, the name is omit-
ted. The purpo.se of the bibliography is to explain the 
abbreviations and provide com-plete do CH'lmentary data of' 
the sou roes used. 
The abbreviation tJtr." means either "translator" or 
trtranslated by; n tted." means either ,.edition," '*editor," 
or nedited by;n and trn." means either "footnotew OP "bib-
liographical noteo" Undesignated Roman numerals refer to 
volumes, Arabie numerals to pages; and, where necessary, 
capitalized letters are used to indicate the first or sec-
ond series of numbers m a given volume. In the case of 
the Prine.. and Regulae, the numerals preceding the text 
reference give the prino iple or rule.. When two dates ap-
pear, the one in pal"entheses is that of the first edition, 
and the other is the edition referFed to. 
All references to Descartes are to the Adam and Tan-
nery edition, Oeuvres de De,scartes. 
Opuscules de 161f-162lo --Op. de 1619-1621 
EXtraits de Bai let, VMD. 
Adam and Tannery(ed. ), OD~ X, 171-204. 
These works are now lost except for parts preserved by 
Baillet. Includes Ol]!pioa, Experiments., and Studium 
bonae mentis. 
Exper menta. --~· 
Preserved in part by Baillet, VMD. 
Adwm and Tannery{ed. ), OD, X, 189-190. 
Olympioa.--~· 
Preser~ed in part by BaUlet, VMD. 





















Robert Nelsor.. Beck w s born in Fort Dodge, Iowa, on 
Sep tember 27, 1924· He is the son or Victor E. Beck (Ph. 
D., 1947, Bost0n Tb1vers1ty) and El izabeth elson Beck. 
Bis family moved to ank to, Minnesota, in 1929, where he 
received most of his second ry seboo1 training. In 1940, 
his f mily moved to Worcest er, assadl ~etts, wher e he 
grad,ated from orth High School in 1941. 
1his Sal!le year, he enters d TTpsala College , E st Orange , 
Ne J ersey, as a fre shman. ~ ith the be inning of orld War 
II, he ret•,rned to Worcester 1n J anuary, 1942, to e nter 
Auto b io gJrrtph:y 
Clark l'lniversity. In J'ovember of that 'J'$.al"~ he enl.isted 
in the t!'nited States lu"Sn:y Enlisted lieservfl Corps, and was 
called to aetive duty en May 30, 1943· While in the set-v-
ice, b.e :Served 1n the Army Specialized ~a1ning Program at 
Lafayette College,, Baston, Penns.ylvania~ the 84th In.£antt7 
Division, the station eomple.men.t .at fort Dix, J"ew Jesey, 
and the Veterans Adm.inistl-:ation Detaebmen.t, BNnx, i'ew 
York.. Re was disc:harged on February 14, 1946. 
He :re~ned to Cl.a:r;ok University at this time to com-
plete his work for the tie gree of' 8,.. A. , with a major in 
English. l:n eons ttl tation with Prof'ess:or Brightman o:t 
Boston University, he also took llrepa.ratQory courses tor 
advanced work in philOSQph;y.,. lie was graduated :from OJ.arlt 
11n1v•rs1ty in J'une, 1947" and earned First Ho:nors dl.lP'ing 
his seniar ;fSIVP• 
Be entered Boston UIIiver~itT as a. eandidate for the 
degree of A. M •. 1n Septembe:P, 1947, and· received 1;bat 
degPee :f.n Jtllle, 1948. The subjeet of his thesis was The 
Platan1~ and Ar1stQtel1an Critieiam\of' Phenomenalism. 
!:rrn$41ately ·upon p&4'1l&t.io,n1 he beeame a candidate :for the 
de vee of Ph. D. av Boston trniver s1ty, and siuce that ttme 
' . . . 
has been pnrsu1ng ~.bat course of.' study. 
On Karch 2.8, 1942; he married the former Gladys 
Elizabeth Jebnson 1n East Orange, _!few JePse7., lie has two 
ehlldreil, Jt~garet Elizabeth, Horn on Sept&mbe:r 10; 1943~ 
and lo A.nne ltarie,. born on. Dee$mber 14, 194.5• He now re-
sidas. in Wilkinsonvllle, Massaehusetts., 
234 
Be ha$ b"a.on thE~ ,faetilty ·or Clark Un1VeJ7·Sity~ ·Wor-
CM~stell"1 Massaehuae-tts, ain~ ·1.947• 'lt\;e ti:r>-st year he was 
an .Assistant Inst~uetol' il'J. :PhllQsophy; and has e1l';Ce been· 
an. lnstruetor in PhUosophy. · ·!Ie has WPittem. aeveral. book 
revie:wts tor the Worcester .Snndaz 'Telegram~ md is tha pres-
ent eflitQl" .of t.he Fll.Uosophical Forum. Re is the Bo~den. 
Parker llo-wne Fe.l.lo1r ... elaot f"or the .,_.~ 1950,..~951 a.t l!&ston 




cartes's method. were·!~' his belief that the potentia.Lities 
fb r knowledge .are eq-aally di~tributed among all men;, his 
interest in mathsnt&ties; and' the notion of the lbtits or 
knowledge. The :motions ot analysis and Spl,thesia" intui-
tion· and dednation, enU1!11er:aidon, and hia view o:f f'o.rmal. 
logic) are. examined .. · ftle concept bf order is b as1e; ·~and 
intuitit:rtl: ·and deduotion ar-e f'ottnd to be,. for Descart.&s, 
asp~e~:s o.r· a· single process .. 
Ch.aptet>. II. 'The . Certa.in ty ot the Cogi to. Descartes t s 
procedure of' m$thoao1Qgical. doubt 1ed to .a rejection of· . 
knowledge 'r'EU)eived fl'Oln the unses.. ·'rbis involved a. rejec-
tion of :the seholaat1o notion of .a Valid intuition of" being-. 
. 
In ta1a d&nia.l, Descartes ts position is taken as eow.ectt 
tor tbe eogito · a.rgu•nt ix~cU.~ates that ilueh intuition is 
not veridical.. ThC!> ent~l"e process or 11letbodolog1cal do:ubt, 
deemed invalid. and ttselesa by so•e or Deseau:>tes' s eorres-
f' 
' pondents, is D.$Vertbeless tak~ to be a VUid and flO"Q&SS&ry 
procednM 1"011 knowleage .. 
,IJ.'he. sk•pt1cal procedure !s bronght to rest '!n the ex-
per:tence 'that ,thin\C:tn~ implies existence, eogito, . E:lt""f£0 SU'tik 
( ' 
Deetut.r:tes ft~:r;"ther argued .that mind. O.l'" p.nsee is more .fut.s Uy 
Jmo:vm. than extension or- body,. and that it basanature as-
aentially different. from extension. · 
ll The logical structure of' Deacartasts oo.g1to has 
been a.tt'acked as ~estlppos:ing a universe.~ premise {Gassendi, 
Merse.nne, Huxley-). .. J)esc~t$s~ howeveJ:L, al"gued tha:t lmawl-
e~ begins with :partieule.ra; $nd hence tb.e cogito is no 


t1on of th& ideaJ and that henae this attack is not de$-
t:r~ct1ve. .The sec.ond ~t iS· trom d&J>tlnden~- It is 
round tba. t this proof' establishes, only cb~J.pendene.e on some 
:raaetaphysical cause.- Th$ third proof ia th& ontological. 
DesGQr.~sts ~St'llDm t is. ·not. that of .. Al;l~lm~' It is. also 
found thll.t D~seartt;at s at>gmtten t ~WitlistandsLeibnJg•s cri-. 
t1que :tb.&.t it' doe's not esta.'bl.iah a?.d·t$ •possibility." 
The a"rgt .. nt, howecvi¢.t 1: Cb fUt not withstand Kant t a er1 tie ism, 
:for it does not 'b:ri~dge the gap .. between thought :and existence. 
- ., . . 
· . 'Desealftes • s idea of perfection: is; taken to be sn 1m• · 
port&.nt de.ttU tol'!' the Bgumsnt .far God;: b.nt it is eoncl ua:ed 
that this datum is inlt"Offieisnt to es.ta'bl,tl!Jh objeetive· 
e:z:istenee in 1 'bs~lt .• 
.. 
Chapter :r;y.· . G5'·d and the Val:td1tt t)f Knowledge. D~s-
cartes argu$d that God. oannot be a d&eeiver b.enause he is 
in!'1n:1t'ely p11Wt:e~t, and to diHUJiYe 1& a species of i:Brper-
feotion. Renee GOd gual"antees <the criterion or cle.&.rn.esa 
-am dis tine tne$s which :ts obse]?Ved in the ca-gi to; · and know-
ledge of- the ex.ternal World is . poas lblth This. l'eft Des~arte:s 
witb. tb& problem of.fl.rror. Jles~artes's $0l11t1on of tbe, 
p~obl$m is ~und. to ~· nn$a.tis:tactm\y i an.~ the at taeks on 
. ·- .·. 
1 t ( GB.sa&.nd 1) &rff · tQrind to be Vttl id... Descartes's view ot 
the •te:rnal ~uth_s f're:&ly will &d.· by; God (a ttack:ed. -espe.oh.l'.;. · 
ly .by . teib.n.is) :I~ f.oumi to be nntenablEk~ 
Des~t.llfs':s oriterion of tl"Uth ia one of intuition. It 
w-a.e Attacked bf· Ho:bbes,. Ga.sse_nd:t,. end L$1bniz~- His criterion 
13 deemed inltdeq\ul.t&. · 

